In
1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics inaugurated a media campaign to bring
the drug marihuana under the control of federal legislation. Over the
next seven years the Bureau gradually built a case against the new drug.
According to the Bureau, marihuana use was a threat of national proportions.
Backed by an arsenal of statistics, the Bureau proceeded to inform the public
of the impending danger and to recommend that the cultivation of marihuana be
prohibited in this country, claiming that such action was its sworn duty. This
claim is very strange because, prior to 1930, the issue of marihuana had never
been considered to be of national importance. In fact, the available evidence
suggests that there was never a true problem with marihuana. The reality of
this observation is self-evident from the name, marihuana, which was nothing
more than a localized-Mexican colloquialism for cannabis or hemp: the same
plant which had evolved in a unique symbiosis with humanity throughout
history. A simple examination tracing the evolution of the marihuana issue
reveals that the Bureau's campaign to prohibit marihuana lacked both a
historical and a scientific precedent. The importance of this fact is crucial
to the present hypothesis, that marihuana was demonized because of the hemp
plant's economic potential, because, without a historical or scientific
precedent, the Bureau was without a valid motive for the action it took
against marihuana.
Ironically,
the same drug denoted by the term, marihuana, appears to have had a long and
illustrious history of religious, recreational, and medicinal use among many
different cultures. Knowledge of the drug disappeared in the West during the
Middle Ages, but it persisted in the East. In the eighteenth century, the
British encountered the Indian customs of using bhang, charas, and ganja, all
of which were cannabis drugs. British officials stationed in India claimed
that the Indian use of cannabis drugs caused insanity, crime, and violent
behavior among the native population. Based on these allegations, the colonial
governors typically lobbied for prohibitive legislation, but the home
government always investigated the charges against cannabis and never found
any evidence to support the claims of their officials.
During
the nineteenth century, more middle and upper class British migrated to India
as employees of the great trading companies and the home government. This new
wave of foreign administrators associated the Indian custom of using cannabis
drugs with the dismal conditions of life among the lower classes of India.
Over time, this economically biased and racist assumption caught the attention
of officials back in England who were members of the Temperance League. In
1893, these Progressively-minded officials lobbied for the formation of the
Indian Hemp Drugs Commission to determine whether or not cannabis drugs should
be prohibited in India. After a year of painstaking observation and
questioning, the commission produced a comprehensive report on the use of
cannabis drugs. Despite the rumors, no serious problems were found to exist
with the consumption of cannabis drugs and, consequently, the commission
advised against prohibition.
Earlier
in the nineteenth century, the medicinal use of cannabis was rediscovered by a
physician in the British Army, W. B. O'Shaugnessy. While stationed in India's
Bengal province, Dr. O'Shaugnessy observed Indian doctors using cannabis
medicines to cure a number of illnesses and diseases untreatable in the West.
Based on his firsthand experience, Dr. O'Shaugnessy published a forty-page
paper in 1839 on the therapeutic properties of cannabis. This study
resurrected the medicinal use of the drug in the West. By the turn of the
century, the extract of cannabis had become a main ingredient in many simple
patent medicines. Eventually, the U.S. Department of Agriculture even
published a circular about the cultivation of cannabis, for farmers interested
in selling the crop to the pharmaceutical industry during the 1920s.
Significantly, until the late 1930s, cannabis medicines were available at
local drug stores throughout the nation.
The
medicinal use of cannabis first received federal recognition in 1906, under
the Pure Food and Drug Act. Inspired by the Progressive ideology of the day,
the legislators required that the ingredients of all medicines be printed on a
label for the public to view. During the years following the passage of the
Pure Food and Drug Act, lobbying was initiated for stricter legislation which
eventually culminated in the passage of the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914. At
first, legislators included cannabis under the provisions of the act, but a
formidable lobby arose and challenged the initial decision to include
cannabis. This lobby was led by doctor and pharmacist associations, such as
the American Medical Association and the National Association of Retail
Druggists. During a 1911 hearing before the House Ways and Means Committee,
Charles A. West, testifying for the National Wholesale Druggist Association,
stated that cannabis was not habit inducing like the derivatives of the
opiates and coca products. Testimony like West's caused Congress to drop
cannabis from the provisions of the Act. In 1914, there was not a problem with
cannabis drugs, otherwise, the politicians would have passed the Harrison Act
in its original form.
Nevertheless,
between 1914 and 1931, local movements succeeded in lobbying twenty-nine
states, seventeen of which were west of the Mississippi River, for the passage
of ordinances banning the non-medicinal use of marihuana. Initially,
anti-marihuana legislation was sought in the Southwest. Local law enforcement
officials spread rumors claiming that the use of marihuana among the Mexican
population caused crime and induced violent behavior. Laws were easily passed
on the basis of these rumors on the state and local level. The true motivation
for such legislation was the oppression of the Mexican immigrants, who used
marihuana. Later, during the 1920s, the use of marihuana became established in
many cities as part of the African-American inspired jazz scene. The cultural
revolution occurring within the jazz scene frightened Progressives, who
hastily labeled marihuana a narcotic drug and lobbied for its prohibition.
Throughout this period of time, from 1914 to 1931, local and state movements
against the use of marihuana continuously failed to prove that there was
anything harmful or dangerous about the drug. Instead, the movements were
ultimately motivated by xenophobia and driven by the Progressive desire to
correct society's ills.
In
1914, El Paso, Texas, became the first location in America to pass legislation
prohibiting the cultivation, importation, and use of marihuana. The basis for
this legislation typified the emerging attitude of the American Southwest
toward the Mexican custom of smoking marihuana. Situated on the border, El
Paso was a major center of interaction between America and Mexico. The Mexican
immigrants were part of an economic underclass which lived in perpetual
poverty. They were ruthlessly exploited by American capitalists who employed
them as labors at sub-minimum wage. During the first quarter of this century,
many Americans were economically displaced by the influx of half a million
Mexican immigrants into the job market. Small farmers and labor unions were
particularly threatened by the Mexicans who were hired at significantly
cheaper wages by the larger commercial farming operations and local
industries. Animosity developed as Americans lost jobs to the Mexicans. In
time, the Americans discovered the Mexican custom of smoking marihuana, and,
shortly thereafter, local authorities started a rumor that the drug caused
crime and violence among the Mexican population.
The
origin of this rumor appears to have been a common Mexican saying, "Esta
ya ledio las tres" ("you take it three times"). According to
local folklore, the first smoke induced a feeling of well-being; the second
caused extreme elation coupled with activity; and the third supposedly made
the smoker oblivious to danger, quarrelsome, delirious, destructive, and
conscious of superhuman strength. Given such a reputation, marihuana quickly
became a source of concern among local law enforcement officials.
Unfortunately, in their haste to control a potential problem, local officials
failed to take into account the dismal socio-economic conditions which
confronted the Mexican immigrants in America. Rather than face reality, local
officials were motivated by the political expediency of a scapegoat like
marihuana as they blamed the problems of crime and violence in the Mexican
communities on the drug. By example, the following statement from a law
enforcement officer stationed in the Southwest typified the emerging attitude
toward marihuana:
"Under its baseful influence reckless men become
bloodthirsty, terribly daring, and dangerous to an uncontrollable
degree."
This
type of racist and socio-economic bigotry spread like a contagious virus and
it was the principal reason for the trend of anti-marihuana legislation on the
state level, as well as the main rallying cry of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics for federal legislation against marihuana. Ironically, there was not
a vapor of truth to any of the claims that the use of marihuana caused crime
and violence. The veracity of the previous statement was a well known fact
among the experts, but for some reason the truth was ignored through the whole
period. For instance, in 1926, after about a decade of contact with El Paso,
Dr. W. W. Stockberger of the Bureau of Plant Industry, explained that his
agency's knowledge about marihuana did not concur with the reports they had
been receiving from El Paso. In fact, Dr. Stockberger's description of the
effects of marihuana contradicted the claim that marihuana induced violent
behavior among users. He stated, "The reported effects of the drug on
Mexicans, making them want to 'clean up the town,' do not jibe very well with
the effects of cannabis, which so far as we have reports, simply causes
temporary elation, followed by depression and heavy sleep."
Regardless
of the truth, the authorities from El Paso were driven by their xenophobia to
issue a complaint against marihuana to the federal government in 1915.
Chiefly, the complaint urged for stricter regulations against the importation
of marihuana from Mexico. And, despite its blatantly racist overtone, Dr.
Alsberg (no first name given), the Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, brought
the complaint to the attention of the Secretary of Agriculture, who hastily
presented an official request to the Secretary of Treasury. On September 25,
1915, a ban on the importation of marihuana for other than medicinal purposes
was promptly implemented in Treasury Decision 35719.
Two
years later, Dr. Alsberg dispatched his personal assistant, Reginald Smith, on
a tour of eleven cities located along the southwestern border with Mexico.
While he was on this tour Smith gathered information and conducted interviews
regarding Treasury Decision 35719. Through this process, Smith discovered that
marihuana was used infrequently for various medicinal purposes, such as
child-birth, asthma, and gonorrhea among the Mexicans of "low
birth." He also found that, although, the drug was widely smoked for
recreational purposes by the Mexicans as well as some "Negroes" and
"lower class whites." The total demand for the drug was easily met
by local cultivation, street sales, and by general availability at grocery and
drug stores. In his final assessment, Smith claimed that the drug was
injurious to the health of the smoker and often caused the user to commit
heinous crimes. Closer inspection reveals that Smith based his grand
assumptions on second-hand information, which he had gathered during
interviews conducted with biased local officials who provided no first-hand
evidence to support their testimony. Simply put, Smith's report lacked
scientific credibility. This deficiency did not deter Smith from concluding
that Treasury Decision 35719 was completely ineffective. And, in its place, he
suggested that the more stringent Harrison Act be amended to include cannabis.
Congress, however, ignored the alleged problem.
Meanwhile,
by 1916, American military authorities stationed in the Panama Canal Zone
began to suspect that army personnel were smoking marihuana. Eventually, in
1925, a formal committee was convened to investigate the alleged Canal Zone
marihuana problem. And, after a series of firsthand experiments as well as an
extensive examination of personal testimony and military files, the committee
reached the following conclusion: "There is no evidence that marihuana as
grown and used here is a 'habit-forming' drug in the sense in which the term
is applied to alcohol, opium, cocaine, etc., or that it has any appreciably
deleterious influence on the individual using it." Ironically, the native
custom of smoking marihuana in Panama was the same as the Mexican custom, but
the truth remained classified and hidden from the public.
Mexicans
were not the only scapegoats in the early efforts to prohibit the use of
marihuana. African-Americans in the lower class communities of New Orleans had
long enjoyed marihuana as a recreational pastime. Originally, the drug had
been introduced by Caribbean sailors and West Indian immigrants. They passed
the custom on to the African-Americans. Marihuana cigarettes, commonly known
as reefers, were ritually smoked by the African-American musicians who created
blues and jazz. Their music acted like a catalyst stimulating a positive
cultural interaction between the African-Americans who shared their music, and
the Latinos and whites who joined the jazz scene because of an admiration for
the music. During the 1920s, jazz became a cultural phenomenon and quickly
spread from New Orleans to other urban centers and, naturally, the use of
marihuana followed the music. Jazz quarters soon became established in the
midst of the nation's inner cities, where crime and violence were perpetual
problems. Local officials, searching for simplistic causation, blamed the
endemic inner city crime and violence, not on the depressed socio-economic
conditions of the lower class who lived in the troubled areas, but rather on
their use of marihuana. This urban trend, to blame the woes of the inner city
on the use of marihuana, was strikingly similar to the scenario which had
unfolded in the Southwest, except, that in the cities the anti-marihuana fight
gained a new perspective. Specifically, agitators deliberately classified
marihuana as a narcotic.
Earlier
in the century, Progressives sought to prohibit the use of opiates and coca
products because of their addictive properties. To support their goals,
Progressives created the negative terminology of narcotics and cast the addict
in the role of society's most evil criminal. Eventually, the Harrison Narcotic
Act was passed in 1914, based on the lobbying of the Progressives. Cannabis
drugs were specifically omitted from the list of substances controlled by the
Harrison Narcotics Act because they did not produce the negative effects
commonly attributed to other narcotics. However, during the 1920s, marihuana
was informally labeled a narcotic. This strategy first emerged in New Orleans
and then later it surfaced in Chicago. Both of these cities possessed large
and popular jazz quarters in which the smoking of marihuana was widespread.
The Progressive majority of the predominantly WASP middle- and upper-class
America generally feared the cultural revolution occurring on the jazz scene.
Consequently, local officials seized the political opportunity to label
marihuana a narcotic and campaign against the evils of the drug on the basis
of the public's prejudices. Such action demonstrated their adherence to the
ideological tenets of Progressivism and translated into easy votes in the
future. As with the scenario in the Southwest, there was a total disregard for
the objective truth about marihuana in the urban movements.
Further
misinformation about marihuana evolved separately from the Southwestern and
urban movements during the first part of the twentieth century. Among the
wealthier classes a new type of recreational drug, hashish, became popular.
This drug was produced from the resin of the female hemp plant's flowers and,
in many instances, it was combined with an opiate or a mild hallucinogen such
as datura (a plant of the nightshade family). Consequently, the effects of
cannabis were often confused with the effects of the other more powerful drugs
which were often included in the "hashish" mixture.
Jacques-Joseph
Moreau, a nineteenth century French doctor, became interested in experimenting
with hashish on the premise that its pharmaceutical properties could induce a
mental breakdown, and thus aid in the treatment of mental illness. He
published his studies as, Hashish and Mental Illness in the
mid-nineteenth century. During the course of his research, Dr. Moreau came
into contact with the Club des Hachichins, an elite literary club
founded by Theophile Gautier, which included the likes of such writers as
Dumas, de Nerval, Hugo, Boissard, and Delacroix. Once a month in the lobby of
the Hotel Lauzun, in the Latin Quarter of Paris, Dr. Moreau met with these
authors and dispensed his hashish among them. During these meetings, Dr.
Moreau and his subjects kept records of their thoughts and the effects of the
drug as they entered altered states of mind. Through their work they helped
create an image of hashish which probably damaged the public's perception of
the drug. In particular, they attributed the negative effects of the harsher
drugs, such as the addiction of opium or the hallucinations of datura, to
cannabis, which was the main ingredient of hashish.
More
importantly, this clique of writers helped to proliferate a myth about hashish
which would become a weapon of propaganda in the anti-marihuana campaign.
Specifically, these authors were fascinated with Silvestre de Sacy's
hypothesis that hashish was the grass of which Marco Polo wrote as the secret
elixir of the infamous Assassins, the arch-enemies of the Knights Templars
during the Crusades. According to legend, the Assassins' leader, the Old Man
on the Mountain, gave his zealots hashish before battle. Supposedly, the drug
caused the user to become a berserk, blood-thirsty killing machine. Although
the knowledge of hashish and its sensationalized myth remained confined to a
limited audience, word of it spread from French literary circles to English,
and finally on to America. In America, the writers of the Bohemian genera like
Bernard Taylor and Fitz Hugh Ludlow were the first to openly dabble with the
drug and employ its mythology in their fiction. In time, other journalistic
ventures, such as medical and psychological journals, exploited the myth of
the Assassins and introduced it to mainstream America. Eventually, by the late
1920s, this exotic fantasy about hashish was cited as if it were a historical
fact by anti-marihuana proponents.
In
retrospect, the legislation against marihuana on the state and local level,
between 1914 and 1930, was the direct result of xenophobia and the Progressive
mentality. This observation is particularly disturbing since the motivating
factors for these laws were not historically or scientifically credible.
Instead, each campaign against marihuana relied on rumors, prevarications,
biases, and outright racism. In many instances local officials managed to pass
laws against marihuana without the public's knowledge. If and when the media
did cover an anti-marihuana campaign, no effort was made to provide the public
with an objective story. Instead, the media played with the conventions of the
myth of the Assassins, Progressive morality, and xenophobically inspired
misrepresentations. In the end, both the media and local government were
responsible for perpetuating these fallacies and creating a precedent for
federal legislation in the future.
Despite
the many incidents of anti-marihuana legislation on the state and local level,
the federal government ignored all cannabis drugs until 1929. At this late
date Congress included Indian Hemp on the list of drugs which were to be
treated at two newly created narcotic farms. In retrospect, Congress's action
was merely a token gesture of recognition, rather than an attempt to address a
true problem. The clinics were established for the treatment of patients who
had serious dependency problems with opiates. However, through some medium,
the legislators became aware that Indian Hemp had been a topic during a recent
international narcotic conference, and because of this they decided to include
Indian Hemp in the final draft of the narcotic farms' charters.
Later,
during 1929, the federal government formally acknowledged the existence of
marihuana. Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas introduced the first federal
anti-marihuana legislation. His bill, S. 2075, provided for the inclusion of
marihuana in the Narcotic Drugs Export and Import Act which had been passed in
1922 without considering marihuana. In 1929, Congress's knowledge about
marihuana was extremely limited, therefore, Senator Lawrence Phipps requested
that the Surgeon General conduct a study on the marihuana problem as it would
relate to the proposed bill, S. 2075. The subsequent report was entitled
Preliminary Report on Indian Hemp and Peyote. This report was presented
and accepted as if it were the final word on the subject of marihuana when, in
reality, it displayed total disregard for the standards of objectivity and
blatantly ignored the findings of both the 1925 Panama Canal Zone Report and
the British Indian Hemp Commission Report. In place of the
well-established truth, the Preliminary Report on Indian Hemp and Peyote
labeled marihuana a narcotic and presented the myth of the Assassins as
historical fact. Furthermore, it lent official confirmation to the unfounded
rumor that marihuana possessed the capability of inducing addictive, criminal,
and even insane behavior. Needless to say, this document had a significant
impact on the perception of marihuana in Congress, but apparently not enough,
because S. 2075 died in committee.
Just
as S. 2075 was being laid to rest, Congress took a giant step forward and
created a new agency to oversee the nation's drug problem. On June 14, 1930,
the Federal Narcotics Control Board and the narcotics division of the Bureau
of Prohibition were terminated and their responsibilities were placed under
the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which became an
independent division of the Treasury Department. Harry J. Anslinger was chosen
to head the Bureau. The new Commissioner had already distinguished himself as
a capable enforcer with the Bureau of Prohibition's narcotics task force, not
to mention the fact that he was destined to become the nephew-in-law of the
Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon. From the moment of the Bureau's
creation, Commissioner Anslinger decided to push for the total prohibition of
marihuana, based on the premise that the need to control potential cannabis
addiction outweighed the drug's limited medicinal value. In this context, one
of the first orders of business for the newly created Bureau became the
enactment of a uniform state narcotic law with cannabis included in its
provisions.
The
American Medical Association decided to draft the first uniform narcotic act
in 1922, because of a lack of uniformity in record keeping, weak enforcement
against violators, and growing hysteria in the public about addicts and crime.
The following year a committee of fifteen Representatives from ten
pharmaceutical companies and two representatives from the medical profession
approved the original version of the uniform state narcotic law. Meanwhile,
these efforts were overshadowed by the creation of the National Conference of
Commissioners for Uniform State Laws. The larger movement was composed of two
representatives from each state, who were appointed by their respective
governors. In 1924, the Commissioners created a committee to draft a uniform
state narcotic act. This led to the first draft of the Uniform State Narcotic
Act in 1925, hereafter referred to as the UNDA (Uniform Narcotic Drug Act).
Cannabis was included in the Act's provisions but nothing ever came of this
draft. Further work was shelved until 1928, when a second draft was composed.
In this version of the Act, the inclusion of cannabis was made optional, but
again the Act failed to receive the attention of the Commissioners. This trend
continued as two more drafts were written up and presented in 1929 and 1930.
After
1930, the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics made the fight to include
marihuana in the provisions of the UNDA an issue of high priority. A policy of
misinformation was hastily adopted and formalized in a slickly packaged media
campaign. Ironically, this propaganda reflected the prejudice of xenophobic
attitudes, the morality of Progressive policy toward narcotics, and the
tendency for sensationalized stories, such as the myth of the Assassins. The
Bureau's first move was to cite the Wickersham Commission Report on Crime
and the Foreign Born of 1929. One volume of the report, the Warnhuis
Study, attempted to justify the blatantly false and racist argument
linking marihuana, Mexicans, and crime. Besides the Warnhuis Study, the
Bureau brought forth media and police reports regarding alleged marihuana
problems in several cities. Like the rumors about the Mexican use of marihuana
from the Southwest, these reports had a definite racial and socio-economic
bias. For further ammunition against marihuana, the Bureau also cited the
findings of the erroneous Preliminary Report on Indian Hemp and Peyote.
Whether
this material was truthful or believable was not the issue, especially when
the point that it made supported the Bureau's position and goal. The Bureau
officially unleashed this propaganda to the public in 1931 through two
Christian Science Monitor articles. The headline of the first article
read: "Drug Used by Mexican Aliens Finds Loophole in the U. S. Laws -
Spread of Growth of Marihuana in Wake of Immigrants Causes Grave Concern at
Washington - Effects Described in Wickersham Studies." Then, in a
subsequent issue, a source within the Bureau claimed that: "Instances of
criminals using the drug to give them courage before making brutal forays are
occurrences commonly known to the narcotics Bureau." Through propaganda
like this, the Bureau attempted to apply pressure on the recalcitrant
pharmaceutical and medical interests which opposed the idea of restrictions on
marihuana.
For
some reason, though, the media were unconcerned with marihuana and the fight
to include the drug in the provisions of the UNDA. As a consequence, the
ensuing debate remained confined to politics and had virtually no influence on
the public. For instance, a New York Times article from 1931 simply
stated that the Narcotic Survey Commission was asking the states to prohibit
the cultivation of marihuana. If there had been a serious problem with
marihuana, the article failed to mention anything specific. Meanwhile, on the
other side of the political debate the pharmaceutical and medical interests
led by the American Medical Association continued to oppose the inclusion of
cannabis. When the UNDA was finally passed in 1932, the inclusion of marihuana
was left to the discretion of the individual states. Evidently, the
Commissioners were not convinced of a problem despite the efforts of the
Bureau.
During
1933, the hemp industry appeared to become a concern of the Bureau when it
requested a report on the hemp industry from the Department of Agriculture.
This report, Hemp Fiber Production, was sent to the Bureau from the
Department of Agriculture in December, 1933. According to the authors of this
report, Dr. Andrew H. Wright and Dr. Lyster H. Dewey, the hemp industry was on
the verge of extinction. Since 1928, the annual harvest of hemp had been a
meager 1000 acres. This cultivation was primarily confined to the state of
Wisconsin. In retrospect, the Bureau's request seems a little unusual since
the Bureau had no formal jurisdiction over marihuana or the hemp industry.
Later, during the spring of 1934, the potential threat of anti-marihuana
legislation led Dr. Wright and Dr. Dewey to contact the Bureau with requests
for information. Both men were confused as to whether or not the new
anti-marihuana laws actually prohibited the legitimate growth of hemp for
industrial purposes.
On
April 7, 1934, the Commissioner responded to Dr. Wright's request by citing an
example of a state law from Nebraska. This particular law had been enacted in
1927. According to the Commissioner, the law completely prohibited the
cultivation of marihuana. Continuing, the Commissioner explained that cannabis
did not rightly fall within the jurisdiction of the federal government,
although with respect to this situation, the Commissioner stated that the
Bureau was behind efforts to control the traffic of cannabis through the
enactment of the optional marihuana clause in the UNDA. As the clause was
written, it did not necessarily prohibit the cultivation of marihuana, but it
did require the licensing of growers and producers. After this, the
Commissioner noted that on the average 1400 acres of hemp had been cultivated
in Wisconsin, Dr. Wright's home state, during the past few seasons and that
there were no regulatory laws. This situation obviously upset the
Commissioner. In his own words, he suggested that the Wisconsin State
Legislature should consider "a special regulatory measure to insure that
the flowering tops of the plant shall not be available for improper or
non-medical use."
Despite
this outward display of concern, the Bureau did not seem to be pressured by
any sense of urgency. Upon an analysis of the Bureau's public record, one
historian was led to conclude that: "The Bureau saw no extraordinary
danger in the use of marihuana between 1930 and 1934. It decried its use by
Mexican-Americans but expressed belief the state laws could control this
illicit activity." During 1933, the Bureau primarily worked with the
states to organize the Uniform State Narcotic Act. But, by April of 1934, only
Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia had passed the optional
marihuana clause. Through the rest of 1934, the Bureau continued to treat the
marihuana issue secondarily, however, toward the end of the year, the Bureau
began to refocus its attention on the drug. Starting in 1935, the Bureau
suddenly unleashed an unprecedented media blitz based on the false premise
that marihuana was a dangerous narcotic capable of inducing criminal and
violent behavior. Except this time around, the Bureau's demeanor and actions
were far more serious and combative than they had been during the initial
campaign for the UNDA. Why this abrupt change of policy occurred has never
been conclusively established.
Despite
any actual verification, the new surge of anti-marihuana activity in 1935 has
been linked to the Bureau's disappointment with the limited success of the
UNDA. From the outset the American Medical Association and the pharmaceutical
companies objected to the legislation and after the passage of the UNDA they
successfully lobbied against the bill at the state level. Late in 1934, the
Bureau decided to counter the opposition of the American Medical Association
and the pharmaceutical companies. For this purpose the Bureau launched their
propaganda campaign during 1935 to stimulate public support for the UNDA and
further federal legislation against marihuana. This act resulted in the
demonization of marihuana and the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.
The
Federal Bureau of Narcotics naturally claimed that there was a genuine
problem, but they failed to provide the hard evidence to substantiate their
claim. Instead, the reality appears to be that the Bureau recycled the rumors,
prevarications, and myths of the past; dressed them in the garb of authority;
and paraded them before the public and the law-makers as a precedent for
oppressive legislation on the federal level. Why did a branch of the federal
government display such an utter disregard for the truth? Based on this
alarming discrepancy, there seems to be good reason to question the rationale
behind the Bureau's final assault against marihuana.
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